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“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (“Fisher II”), the United 
States Supreme Court will decide the constitutionality of the University 
of Texas’s (“University”) affirmative action policy, and the potential 
impact of the Court’s decision on affirmative action programs 
nationwide is being widely debated. Some commentators fear that the 
Court is poised to end affirmative action altogether, thus causing a 
drastic reduction in the number of minorities who are admitted to 
universities across the country.2 Others believe that the Court should use 
Fisher II to invalidate all race-conscious admissions policies and endorse 
a color-blind process.3 Such concerns, along with the expectations of 
those who would like to see affirmative action eliminated, miss the mark.  
A careful analysis of the issues in Fisher II, including the Justices’ 
comments during oral argument, the Court’s affirmative action 
jurisprudence, and the unique aspects of the University’s race-conscious 
admissions policy, suggest that although the University’s policy will 
likely meet its constitutional demise, the impact on affirmative action 
policies nationwide will not be substantial.4 
                                                                                                             
2 See, e.g., Amicus Brief of Society of American Law Teachers in favor of 
Respondent, p. 32, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/11/SALT-14-981-bsac-Society-of-Am-Law-Teachers.pdf (“Indeed, ‘[k]nocking 
out’ the University of Texas’s ‘present system in favor of a strictly enforced color-blind 
norm would cause a huge upheaval in a system that’ can be better adjusted ‘by 
administrators on campus’”) (quoting Richard A. Epstein, The Classical Liberal 
Constitution 539 (2013)). 
3 See, e.g., Amicus Brief of The Cato Institute in Support of Petitioner, p. 32, 
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/fisher-cover.pdf 
(“[a] decision that responds only to Texas’s unique circumstances—that it has no 
conceivable need for racial preferences to achieve broad diversity—could perversely 
have little impact on the practices of schools that subject all applicants to race-based 
holistic review”). 
4 See, e.g., Amicus Brief of Harvard University in Support of Respondent, p.4 
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2015.11.02-bsac-
Harvard-University-Amicus-Brief_149289219_1.pdf (“[m]any of the specific arguments 
made by petitioner are unique to the admissions policy of the University of Texas at 
Austin”). 
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By way of background, the University’s undergraduate admissions 
policy consists of three components. First, the University enrolls nearly 
three-quarters of its entering class by granting automatic admission to 
applicants who graduate in the top ten percent of their high school class 
(“Top Ten Program”).5 Second, the University maintains an Academic 
Achievement Index (“AAI”) that results in the admission of applicants 
who did not graduate in the top ten percent of their class, but who 
nonetheless have extremely high SAT scores and grade point averages.6 
Third, the University uses a holistic review process that combines an 
applicant’s AAI and Personal Achievement Index (“PAI”). Until 2005, 
the PAI was calculated based on weighted scores on two required essays 
and factors including, but not limited to, leadership qualities, 
extracurricular activities, work experience, community service, 
socioeconomic status, and family responsibilities.7 
In 2005, two years after the Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger,8 
the University decided to include race in the holistic review process. In 
the University’s holistic review process that year, only 216 African-
American and Hispanic students—0.9% and 2.4% of the total applicant 
pool—gained admission to an incoming class of 6,322.9 Conversely, in 
2005 and other years, the majority of the University’s minority students, 
some of whom graduate from largely segregated high schools, were 
admitted through a race-neutral process (the Top Ten Program).10   For 
example, in 2008, 21.5% of the students admitted through the 
University’s Top Ten Percent Program were minorities.  In light of these 
facts, the question before the Court in Fisher II is whether the inclusion 
of race in the University’s holistic review process is narrowly tailored to 
achieve educational diversity.11 The answer to this question will likely be 
no. 
As discussed below, the University’s decision to include race in 
holistic review is neither narrowly tailored nor necessary to enroll a 
diverse student body. To begin with, an infinitesimal number of minority 
students are admitted through holistic review, thus underscoring its 
                                                                                                             
5 See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014). 
6 See id. at 638. 
7 See id. at 644. 
8 530 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s race-
conscious admissions policy); see also Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that achieving a diverse student body is a compelling state 
interest). 
9 Fisher, 758 F.3d at 668 (Garza, J., dissenting). 
10 See id. at 650-51. 
11 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12; see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. 
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ineffectiveness in attracting a “critical mass” of minority applicants.12  
Additionally, the University’s inclusion of race in holistic review is 
predicated on a stereotypical assumption that minority students admitted 
through the Top Ten Program are less qualified than minorities admitted 
through the PAI.13 As revealed at oral argument, the University has failed 
to provide any factual basis to support this assumption, or to rebut the 
argument that it is based on precisely the type of pernicious stereotypes 
that the Equal Protection Clause forbids.14 For these reasons, the Court 
will likely hold that the University’s decision to include race in the 
holistic review process is unconstitutional. 
However, the effect on affirmative action policies across the country 
will be virtually non-existent.  First, the Court’s decision will not—and 
should not—mean that race can never be considered in university 
admissions. In fact, the Court has on many occasions reaffirmed the 
principle that achieving a diverse student body is a compelling state 
interest, and that race may be one of many factors that universities 
consider when making admissions decisions. In Fisher I,15 for example, 
the Court explained that a university’s “educational judgment that  . . .  
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer,” 
thus approving of race-conscious admissions policies that satisfy strict 
scrutiny.16 Second, the constitutional infirmities in the University’s 
admissions policy are unlike most, if not all, affirmative action programs. 
As a result, the Court will likely decide Fisher II on narrow grounds and 
hold that, although the University’s policy fails to withstand 
constitutional scrutiny, race may be included in the admissions process 
where necessary to obtain the educational benefits of diversity. 
Part II discusses the Supreme Court’s landmark affirmative action 
decisions and the themes that have emerged from the Court’s 
jurisprudence.  Part III applies the Court’s precedent to the University’s 
holistic review process and argues that it violates the Equal Protection 
                                                                                                             
12 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (holding that “the Law School’s concept 
of critical mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is 
designed to produce”). 
13 See Fisher, 758 F.3d at 670 (Garza, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he majority’s 
discussion of numerous ‘resegregated’ Texas school districts is premised on the 
dangerous assumption that students from those districts (at least those in the top ten 
percent of each class) do not possess the qualities necessary for the 
University of Texas to establish a meaningful campus diversity”). 
14 See U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, Cl. 1 (“[n]o state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). 
15 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (Fisher I). 
16 Id. at 2419 (quoting Grutter, 530 U.S. at 328). 
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Clause. Part IV asserts that the Court’s holding in Fisher II will be 
narrowly crafted and negligibly impact other affirmative action 
programs. In addition, Part IV asserts that the Court’s affirmative action 
jurisprudence should be fundamentally altered because it fails to 
adequately guide lower courts, legislatures, and litigants concerning the 
permissible use of race in the admissions process. As discussed in Part 
IV, a more effective—and honest—approach would be to acknowledge 
that: (1) diversity is an essential part of ensuring inclusion in higher 
education and the workplace; (2) remedying past discrimination is a 
compelling state interest; and (3) in limited circumstances, race may be a 
dispositive factor in the admissions or hiring process. The Court’s 
current framework, although well-intentioned, ignores these realities and 
tries to quantify the role of race in admissions – a task that is impossible, 
unnecessary, and unwise. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE LEADING TO FISHER II 
Race-conscious admissions policies (and affirmative action programs 
generally) are subject to strict scrutiny.  This standard requires 
universities to demonstrate that the inclusion of race furthers a 
compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest.17 Of particular importance to the Court is whether “the means 
chosen ‘fit’ th[e] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no 
possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial 
prejudice or stereotype.”18 Simply put, universities must demonstrate that 
including race in the admissions process is necessary to enroll a diverse 
student body, and that diversity is achieved through means that are 
reasonably calculated to obtain the educational benefits of diversity. 
Over the last few decades, the Court’s decisions regarding race-
conscious admissions policies have embraced three broad principles: (1) 
education diversity is a compelling state interest; (2) universities may 
consider race when making admissions decisions for the purpose of 
achieving educational diversity, provided that universities conduct an 
individualized review of every applicant; and (3) universities may not 
place disproportionate weight on race in the admissions process.19 
                                                                                                             
17 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. 
18 Id. at 333 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)). 
19 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12, 315. 
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A. Bakke v. Regents of the University of California—
Achieving a Diverse Student Body is a Compelling State Interest 
It is well-settled that the interest in achieving a diverse student body 
is unquestionably compelling. In Bakke, Justice Powell wrote for a 
plurality of the Court, holding that “the attainment of a diverse student 
body . . . is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of 
higher education.”20 Justice Powell emphasized that the “nation’s future 
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the ideas and 
mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.”21 
However, the plurality concluded that educational diversity was the 
only permissible justification for including race in the admissions 
process. Justice Powell rejected the proposition that “reducing the 
historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities” constituted a 
compelling state interest, describing it “as an unlawful interest in racial 
balancing.”22 Furthermore, universities may not strive to remedy past 
discrimination “because such measures would risk placing unnecessary 
burdens on innocent third parties ‘who bear no responsibility for 
whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions policy are 
thought to have suffered.’”23 Based on these considerations, the plurality 
adopted a relatively narrow rule governing the constitutionality of race-
conscious admissions policies, holding that “race or ethnic background 
may be deemed a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file,” provided that it 
does not “insulate the individual from comparison with all other 
candidates for the available seats.”24 
B. Grutter v. Bollinger—Reaffirming the “Plus Factor” 
Framework 
In Grutter, the Court reaffirmed the “plus factor” approach that 
Bakke embraced by upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s 
affirmative action policy. The policy strived to “enroll a ‘critical mass’ of 
minority students,’”25 while eschewing any attempt to “assure within its 
student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely 
because of its race or ethnic origin.”26 Writing for the majority, Justice 
O’Connor promoted the educational benefits of diversity, explaining that 
                                                                                                             
20 Id. at 311-12. 
21 Id. at 313 (stating that “tradition and experience lend support to the view that the 
contribution of diversity is substantial”). 
22 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323. 
23 Id. at 324. 
24 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317. 
25 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (internal citations omitted). 
26 Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307). 
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“classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more 
enlightening and interesting” when students have “the greatest possible 
variety of backgrounds.”27 However, relying on Bakke, Justice O’Connor 
noted that diversity encompasses “a far broader array of qualifications 
and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though 
important element.”28 Accordingly, although race may be considered “a 
‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file,”29 it “is only one element in a range 
of factors a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a 
heterogeneous student body.”30 
The Law School’s policy comported with the “plus factor” rule 
because many factors beyond race were considered when making 
admissions decisions.31 As a result, the Law School maintained “a highly 
individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious 
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse 
educational environment.”32 For example, the Law School included 
factors such as fluency in foreign languages, overcoming of adversity, 
community service, and successful professional careers,33 and afforded 
individualized consideration to all applicants, regardless of race.34 
Additionally, the Law School did not quantify race in a manner that 
gave minority applicants an unfair advantage in the admissions process. 
Justice O’Connor noted that the Law School did not award “mechanical, 
predetermined diversity ‘bonuses’ based on race or ethnicity,” and did 
not “limit in any way the broad range of qualities and experiences that 
may be considered valuable contributions to student body diversity.”35 
Justice O’Connor also emphasized that the Law School “frequently 
accepts nonminority applicants with grades and test scores lower than 
underrepresented minority applicants (and other nonminority applicants) 
who are rejected.”36  Consequently, because the Law School sought to 
“assemble a student body that is diverse in ways broader than race,”37 the 
                                                                                                             
27 Id. at 330. 
28 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (Justice Powell stated that “[i]t is not an interest in simple 
ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect 
guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups”). 
29 Id. at 317. 
30 Id. at 314. 
31 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338. 
32 Id. at 337. 
33 Id. (Justice O’Connor explained that the Law School placed substantial weight on an 
applicant’s “promise of making a notable contribution to the class by way of a particular 
strength, attainment, or characteristic—e.g., an unusual intellectual achievement, 
employment experience, nonacademic performance, or personal background”). Id. at 340. 
34 See id. 
35 Id. at 338. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 340 (brackets added). 
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Court concluded that “[t]here is no policy, either de jure or de facto, of 
automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single ‘soft’ variable.”38 
C. Gratz v. Bollinger—Universities May Not Place 
Disproportionate Emphasis on Race in the Admissions Process. 
The Court has invalidated race-conscious policies that place 
excessive emphasis on race or ethnicity. For example, in Gratz, which 
was the companion case to Grutter, the Court invalidated the University 
of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions policy, “which automatically 
distribute[d] 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee 
admission, to every single ‘underrepresented minority’ applicant solely 
because of race.”39 Writing for the majority, former Chief Justice 
Rehnquist held that, to withstand constitutional scrutiny, universities 
must ensure that each applicant is considered “as an individual, assessing 
all of the qualities that individual possesses, and in turn, evaluating that 
individual’s ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher 
education.”40 
Thus, universities may not give preference to applicants solely on the 
basis of race or ethnicity, which itself constitutes discrimination.41 For 
this reason, universities cannot adopt quota systems, which would 
“insulat[e] each category of applicants with certain desired qualifications 
from competition with all other applicants.”42 Rather, race-conscious 
admissions policies must be “flexible enough to consider all pertinent 
elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each 
applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, 
although not necessarily according them the same weight.”43 This 
approach reflected Bakke’s core holding, particularly the principle that 
race alone, or any single characteristic, cannot contribute to the diversity 
of a student body. 44 
Against this backdrop, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the 
University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions policy ran afoul of 
Bakke’s prescriptions: 
The . . . policy automatically distributes 20 points to 
every single applicant from an “underrepresented
                                                                                                             
38 Id. at 337 (emphasis added). 
39 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003). 
40 Id. at 271. 
41 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. 
42 Id. at 315. 
43 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. 
44 See id. (stating that Bakke did not “contemplate that any single characteristic 
automatically ensured a specific and identifiable contribution to a university’s diversity”). 
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 minority” group, as defined by the University. The only 
consideration that accompanies this distribution 
of points is a factual review of an application to 
determine whether an individual is a member of one of 
these minority groups. Moreover, unlike Justice Powell’s 
example, where the race of a “particular black applicant” 
could be considered without being decisive, see  the 
LSA’s automatic distribution of 20 points has the effect 
of making “the factor of race . . . decisive” for virtually 
every minimally qualified underrepresented minority
 applicant.45 
Simply put, the university’s excessive emphasis on race precluded a 
truly individualized consideration of each applicant. For example, 
“[e]ven if student C’s ‘extraordinary artistic talent’ rivaled that of Monet 
or Picasso, the applicant would receive, at most, five points under the 
LSA’s system,” whereas “every single underrepresented minority
 applicant, including students A and B, would automatically receive
 20 points for submitting an application.”46 As such, “[i]nstead of 
considering how the differing backgrounds, experiences, and 
characteristics of students A, B, and C might benefit the University, 
admissions counselors . . . simply award both A and B 20 points because 
their applications indicate that they are African–American, and student C 
would receive up to 5 points for his ‘extraordinary talent.’”47 For these 
                                                                                                             
45 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72. In support of this holding, Justice Rehnquist cited 
Harvard University’s Admissions policy as an example of a permissible affirmative 
action policy:  
 
The Admissions Committee, with only a few places left to fill, might 
find itself forced to choose between A, the child of a successful black 
physician in an academic community with promise of superior 
academic performance, and B, a black who grew up in an inner-city 
ghetto of semi-literate parents whose academic achievement was 
lower but who had demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an 
apparently abiding interest in black power. If a good number of black 
students much like A but few like B had already been admitted, the 
Committee might prefer B; and vice versa. If C, a white student with 
extraordinary artistic talent, were also seeking one of the remaining 
places, his unique quality might give him an edge over both A and B. 
Thus, the critical criteria are often individual qualities or 
experience not dependent upon race but sometimes associated with 
it.” Id. at 272-73 (emphasis in original).  
 
46 Id. at 273. 
47 Id. 
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reasons, University of Michigan’s admissions policy ran afoul of Bakke’s 
prescriptions. 
The themes emerging from the Court’s jurisprudence suggest that 
race-conscious admissions policies are evaluated along a continuum that, 
at one extreme, permits color-blind admissions, and at the other, 
prohibits quotas. The vast majority of cases fall into a nebulous gray area 
in which the Court analyzes whether a university’s consideration of race 
is encompassed within a holistic admissions process that retains 
individualized consideration of all applicants and considers a wide array 
of factors unrelated to race. 
III. WHY THE COURT WILL LIKELY FIND THAT THE UNIVERSITY’S 
HOLISTIC REVIEW  PROCESS FAILS TO WITHSTAND 
CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY, AND WHY IT WILL NOT AFFECT MOST 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES 
The Court will likely invalidate the University’s admissions policy 
for three reasons. First, it is not narrowly tailored. Second, the Policy is 
based on stereotypical assumptions about the quality of applicants 
admitted through the Top Ten Program. Third, the University did not set 
forth a sufficient factual basis demonstrating that the addition of race to 
the PAI was necessary to enroll a diverse student body. 
A. The Holistic Review Process is Not Narrowly Tailored to 
Achieve the Educational Benefits of Diversity 
Race-conscious affirmative action policies are permissible only when 
“necessary and narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental 
interest.”48 Courts must examine whether there is “a close ‘fit’ between 
this goal [achieving a “critical mass” of diversity] and the admissions 
policy’s consideration of race.”49 In conducting this analysis, courts 
“must give ‘no deference,’ to a state actor’s assertion that its chosen 
‘means. . . to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to that goal.’”50 
The University’s holistic review process is not narrowly tailored. As 
stated above, in 2008, the year in which the University denied admission 
to Petitioner, 21.5% of applicants admitted through the Top Ten Percent 
Program were African American and Hispanic. Conversely, the 
University’s holistic review process, which since 2005 had included race 
as a factor in calculating the PAI, only accounted for 2.4% and 0.9% of 
                                                                                                             
48 Fisher, 758 F.3d at 664 (Garza, J., dissenting). 
49 Id. at 666 (brackets added). 
50 Id. at 665 (quoting Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420). 
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Hispanic and African American enrollment, or 216 African–American 
and Hispanic students  out of an entering class of 6,322.51 Consequently, 
the vast majority of incoming minority students, many of whom come 
from largely segregated high schools, are chosen through race-neutral 
means.52 Furthermore, “the minimal impact of . . .  racial classifications 
on school enrollment casts doubt on the necessity of using racial 
classifications.”53 The University’s inclusion of race in holistic review 
creates such doubt because its use of race has only a de minimis impact 
on minority admissions.54 
Ultimately, to hold that the University’s affirmative action policy is 
narrowly tailored would require this Court to countenance the 
stereotyping of African-American and Hispanic applicants based on their 
socio-economic status, based on the fact that they graduated from 
segregated schools, and based on the disadvantages they face due to past 
discrimination. 
B. The Addition of Race in Holistic Review is Based on 
Impermissible Stereotyping 
The University’s affirmative action policy, although well-
intentioned, is predicated on the impermissible stereotyping of minority 
applicants admitted through the Top Ten Program. At oral argument, 
Justice Alito stated as follows: 
[O]ne of the things I find troubling about your argument
 is the suggestion that there is something deficient about
 the African-American students and the Hispanic 
students who are admitted under the top 10 percent plan. 
They’re not dynamic. They’re not leaders. They’re not 
change agents. And I don’t know what the basis for that 
is.55 
As Justice Alito argued, “[i]t’s kind of the assumption that . . . if a 
black student or a Hispanic student is admitted as part of the top 10 
percent plan, it has to be because that student didn’t have to compete 
                                                                                                             
51 See id. at 668 (Garza, J., dissenting). 
52 See id. at 650-51. 
53 Seattle School District Number 1, 551 U.S. at 734. 
54 See Fisher, 758 F. 3d at 668 (Garza, J., dissenting) (questioning how “a small, 
marginal increase in minority admissions is necessary to achieving its diversity goals”); 
Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“the 
small number of assignments affected suggests that the schools could have achieved their 
stated ends through different means”). 
55 Fisher II, Oral Argument Transcript, p. 41, lines 5-11. 
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against very many white—and Asians.”56 For Justice Alito, this 
assumption constituted “a really pernicious stereotype.”57 
Judge Emilio Garza echoed these sentiments in his dissenting 
opinion below, stating that the majority “firmly adopt[ed]” the 
University’s assumption that “minority students from majority-minority 
Texas high schools are inherently limited in their ability to contribute to 
the University’s vision of a diverse student body.”58 Additionally, the 
Fifth Circuit’s reliance on the re-segregation of some Texas school 
districts as indicative of lesser-qualified students was “premised on the 
dangerous assumption that students from those districts (at least those in 
the top ten percent of each class) do not possess the qualities necessary 
for the University of Texas to establish meaningful campus diversity.”59 
In this way, the Fifth Circuit “engage[d] in the very stereotyping that the 
Equal Protection Clause abhors.”60  This is precisely why racial 
                                                                                                             
56 Id. at p. 42, p. 19-25. 
57 Fisher, 758 F.3d at 669 (Garza, J., dissenting). 
58 Id. at 670. Judge Garza stated:  
 
The University has not shown that qualitative diversity is absent 
among the minority students admitted under the race-neutral Top Ten 
Percent [Policy]. That is, the University does not evaluate the 
diversity present in this group before deploying racial classifications 
to fill the remaining seats. The University does not assess whether 
Top Ten Percent Law admittees exhibit sufficient diversity within 
diversity, whether the requisite “change agents” are among them, and 
whether these admittees are able, collectively or individually, to 
combat pernicious stereotypes. There is no such evaluation despite 
the fact that Top Ten Percent Law admittees also submit applications 
with essays, and are even assigned PAI scores for purposes of 
admission to individual schools. Id. at 669 (brackets added).  
 
59 Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Richmond, 488 U.S. at 500 (unless 
classifications based on race are “strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact 
promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility”); cf. J.E.B v. 
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 139 (1994) (“We have made abundantly clear in past cases that 
gender classifications that rest on impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal 
Protection Clause, even when some statistical support can be conjured up for the 
generalization”); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (invalidating a 
stereotype-based classification even though the underlying generalization did not, on its 
face, discriminate against a particular gender). 
60 Id. see also Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (“[d]istinctions between 
citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free 
people . . . .”); Richmond, 488 U.S. at 493 (there must be “little or no possibility that the 
motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype”); cf. U.S. v. 
Virginia 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996) (states may not enact laws that rely on “overbroad 
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and 
females,” particularly when the states control the “gates to opportunity”); Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (“We are beyond the day when an 
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classifications are “too pernicious to permit any but the most 
exact connection between justification and classification.”61 
The stereotypical assumptions underlying the inclusion of race in 
holistic review actually fuels the fire generated by the already existing 
racial tensions between African-Americans and Caucasians by promoting 
intra-racial stereotyping and validating an insidious notion of intra-racial 
inferiority—all under the guise of affirmative action. This is certainly not 
the way to stop discriminating on the basis of race. On these facts, to 
hold that the University’s holistic review process is narrowly tailored 
would be to render strict scrutiny “strict in theory but feeble in fact.”62 
C. The University Failed to Offer Factual Support 
Demonstrating the Need to Include Race in the PAI 
The University never examined the backgrounds and personal 
characteristics of students admitted through the Top Ten Program. 
Instead, the University simply assumed that those admitted through the 
Top Ten Program were less qualified than minorities admitted through 
holistic review. As Judge Garza noted in his dissent, the “record [did] not 
indicate that the University evaluate[d] students admitted under the Top 
Ten Percent [Program], checking for indicia of qualitative diversity . . . 
before determining that race should be considered in the holistic review 
process to fill the remaining seats in the class.”63 Petitioner’s counsel, 
Bert Rein, emphasized this point during oral arguments: 
When you really look at what the Fifth Circuit said, they 
said it’s based on two assumptions: One, the Top Ten 
are drawn from these minority high schools. Where did 
they come up with that? They [the University] never 
studied the pattern of the Top Ten admits. How do you 
know that a Hispanic or an African-American student 
can’t be in the Top Ten at what they might call an 
integrated, high-performing school? That’s a 
stereotypical assumption.64 
Thus, “even accepting the University’s broad and generic qualitative 
diversity ends,” the University failed to demonstrate that its race-
                                                                                                             
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched 
the stereotype associated with their group”). 
61 Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. at 720 (quoting Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (2003)) 
(quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980)) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
62 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. 
63 Id. at 670-71(brackets added). 
64 Fisher II, Transcript of Oral Argument, p. 91, lines 7-15. 
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conscious policy is necessary to produce a diverse student body.65 
Moreover, even if the University’s holistic review process “allows it to 
select for ‘other types of diversity’ beyond race alone,” what possible 
justification supports including race as a factor in that process, 
particularly when the University admits a substantial number of minority 
applicants through its Top Ten Percent Program?66 The belief—rooted in 
impermissible racial and ethnic stereotyping—that minorities from 
segregated schools are not as qualified as those attending predominantly 
white high schools and living in affluent neighborhoods. Even the most 
ardent supporters of affirmative action would not countenance such a 
blatant example of masking racial and ethnic stereotyping with “benign” 
motives.67 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF FISHER II ON EXISTING AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION POLICIES 
One of the odd aspects of Fisher II was the amicus briefs filed in 
support of the University, many of which emphasized the importance of 
diversity and argued that a decision in Petitioner’s favor would result in 
the invalidation of affirmative action policies across the country.68 This 
concern is overstated. If the Court invalidates the University’s 
admissions policies, the impact on universities and business 
organizations across the country will be de minimis, and would be 
consistent with the three themes that characterize the Court’s affirmative 
action jurisprudence. 
With respect to business organizations, the impact will be virtually 
non-existent because the justifications for affirmative action programs 
are fundamentally different. In limited circumstances, businesses are 
permitted to implement quote-based affirmative action policies that strive 
to remedy past discrimination. Regarding universities, the impact will be 
insubstantial; universities will be required to ensure that race-conscious 
admissions policies are narrowly tailored, likely by providing a sufficient 
                                                                                                             
65 See Fisher, 758 F.3d at 669 (Garza, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. 
67 See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 (“the analysis and level of scrutiny applied to 
determine the validity of [a racial] classification do not vary simply because the objective 
appears acceptable”) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724, 
n. 9 (1982)); see also Richmond, 488 U.S. at 500 (“the analysis and level of scrutiny 
applied to determine the validity of [a racial] classification do not vary simply because 
the objective appears acceptable”). 
68 See, e.g., Amicus Brief of Society of American Law Teachers in favor of 
Respondent, supra note 2, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/SALT-14-981-bsac-Society-of-Am-Law-Teachers.pdf. 
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factual basis demonstrating the need to consider race in the admissions 
process. Otherwise, the principles enunciated in Grutter will remain 
good law. 
A. Fisher II Will Not Impact Business Organizations Because 
The Justifications for Affirmative Action in Hiring and Admissions 
are Fundamentally Different. 
The justifications for affirmative action programs in the admissions 
and hiring process are fundamentally different. In the hiring context, 
remedying past discrimination is constitutionally permissible. In Wygant 
v. Jackson Board of Education69 the Court held that “although 
societal discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial 
classification,” the “some showing of prior discrimination by the 
governmental unit involved” is permitted “in order to remedy such
 discrimination.”70 In stark contrast to its affirmative action 
jurisprudence, the majority acknowledged that “in order to remedy the 
effects of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take race into 
account,” and that “[a]s part of this [n]ation’s dedication to eradicating 
racial discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon to bear some 
of the burden of the remedy.”71 For example, in United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber,72 the Court upheld a private affirmative action 
program that was designed “to eliminate traditional patterns of racial 
segregation,” and that “reserve[d] for black employees 50% of the 
openings in an in- plant craft-training program until the percentage of 
black craft-workers in the plant is commensurate with the percentage of 
blacks in the local labor force.”73  
The Court’s decisions permit private businesses to prefer race in a 
manner that universities cannot. Quotas such as the one at issue in United 
Steelworkers of America would never pass constitutional muster under 
Bakke and Grutter, and the justification for such a system—remedying 
past discrimination—has been specifically rejected in the admissions 
context. For these reasons, Fisher II will have no impact on businesses 
who adopt race-conscious hiring policies unless the Court holds that race 
can never be a factor in either admissions or hiring decisions. For the 
reasons discussed above, such an unprecedented holding is highly 
unlikely. As Justice Breyer stated during oral argument: 
                                                                                                             
69 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
70 Id. at 274. 
71 Id. at 280-81. 
72 United Steel Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
73 Id. at 197. 
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[P]eople in the universities and elsewhere are worried 
that we will, to use your colleague’s expression, kill 
affirmative action through death by a thousand cuts. We 
promised in Fisher I that we wouldn’t. That opinion by 
seven people reflected no one’s views perfectly. But 
that’s what it says: [Strict in theory,] [n]ot fatal in fact.74 
Justice Breyer’s sentiments, coupled with the Court’s decisions in 
Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher I, suggest that the holding in Fisher II will 
likely be narrow and confined to the unique infirmities in the 
University’s policy. Those infirmities are two-fold: the University cannot 
explain why the inclusion of race in holistic review is necessary to 
achieve the educational benefits of diversity, and the stated reason for 
including race—increasing the quality of minority students—is 
predicated, consciously or subconsciously, on impermissible racial 
stereotypes. 
B.      Universities Must Provide a Factual Basis Supporting the 
Use of Race in the Admissions Process. 
Fisher II will alter race-conscious admissions policies in one 
significant respect. Universities will be required to demonstrate that there 
is a sufficient factual basis justifying the inclusion of race in the 
admissions process. In Fisher II, the Petitioner’s primary argument was 
that the University has failed to make such a showing, which led the 
University to make an impermissible assumption—rooted in racial 
stereotyping—about the quality of minorities admitted through the Top 
Ten Program:  
When you really look at what the Fifth Circuit said, they 
said it’s [the decision upholding the University’s policy] 
based on two assumptions. One, the Top Ten are drawn 
from these minority high schools. Where did they come 
up with that? They never studied the pattern of the Top 
Ten admits. How do you know that a Hispanic or an 
African-American student can’t be in the Top Ten at 
what they call an integrated, high-performing high 
school? That’s a stereotypical assumption.75  
Ultimately, requiring universities to set forth a sufficient factual 
basis demonstrating that “no workable race-neutral alternatives would 
                                                                                                             
74 Fisher II, Transcript of Oral Argument, p. 87, lines 4-11 (brackets added). 
75 Id., p. 91, lines 715 (emphasis added). 
2016]THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THEY STAY THE SAME 17 
 
produce the educational benefits of diversity,” will ensure that all 
applicants receive individualized consideration.76 
C. The Reality—The Court’s Affirmative Action Jurisprudence 
Lacks Cohesion 
The Court’s jurisprudence fails to appropriately guide lower courts 
and university administrators concerning the permissibility of affirmative 
action policies. The Court has been clear that race-neutral admissions 
practices are constitutional, and that a policy establishing quotas for 
specific minority groups is unconstitutional.77 Within these two 
extremes, however, is a large gray area encompassing policies that 
consider race to varying degrees and for different purposes. The Court’s 
precedent offers little guidance on whether these policies are 
constitutional, and while Fisher II will likely bring some clarity by 
requiring universities to provide a more detailed factual basis for race-
conscious admissions policies, it will not adequately guide universities 
regarding when race is “disproportionately” weighed, or what 
“individualized consideration” truly means. 
The reason is due in substantial part to the limited lens through 
which the Court evaluates race-conscious admissions policies. By 
permitting universities to consider race solely to achieve educational 
diversity, the Court is disregarding in the admissions process what it 
acknowledges in the hiring context: a disproportionate reliance on race is 
sometimes necessary to remedy past discrimination, particularly where a 
university has a history of discriminating against minority groups. If 
universities were permitted to adopt admissions policies that strove in 
part to remedy past discrimination, educational opportunities would be 
provided to a larger percentage of minority applicants, and the structural 
and economic inequality that over two centuries of slavery and 
segregation has engendered would be more effectively addressed. To 
deny that the country’s long history of discrimination has not 
disadvantaged minorities, or that remedial measures are necessary to 
address the deleterious effects of slavery and segregation, betrays the 
Constitution’s guarantee of equal liberty for all citizens. 
Put differently, because this country has never lived in a color-blind 
society, it cannot do so now or in the near future. If a university adopts 
an affirmative action policy providing that twenty percent of its incoming 
class will be Africa-American, twenty-percent Hispanic, and twenty 
                                                                                                             
76 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420. 
77 See Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013) 
(upholding a state referendum that prohibited the use of race in the admissions process); 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315. 
18 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1 
 
percent Asian, why should that be problematic, particularly given the 
changing demographics of the United States? And if the stated reason for 
doing so is to remedy past discrimination, why should that be considered 
a violation of the Constitution? This approach would more effectively 
bridge the inequality gap that past discrimination has produced, and that 
prevents many minority applicants from accessing the same opportunities 
or having a fair chance to achieve successful outcomes. 
The fact remains that, until the Court develops a simpler, clearer, and 
more intellectually honest affirmative action jurisprudence, universities 
and businesses will likely go to great lengths to represent that their 
affirmative action policies embrace a holistic and individualized review 
of all applicants. The reality, however, is that these institutions will, at 
least in some cases, admit or hire minority applicants primarily or even 
solely on the basis of race. Universities should not be forced to conceal 
this fact any more than courts should not conceal the fact that racism and 
prejudice have been—and continue to be—pervasive forces denying 
many citizens equal liberty under the law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The fear among some commentators that the Court may eliminate 
affirmative action in Fisher II, or the expectation that the Court will end 
affirmative action altogether, is misplaced. The Court’s holding will 
likely be confined to the uniquely unconstitutional aspects of the 
University’s admissions process, and will have little, if any, impact on 
race-conscious admissions policies or hiring practices in other contexts. 
However, Fisher II does provide the Court with an opportunity to 
reaffirm a core principle: race-based stereotypes offend the very 
justifications underlying affirmative action. Even if, as is the case in 
Fisher II, such assumptions further salutary objectives, the message they 
send to members of minority groups—the very individuals that 
affirmative action strives to benefit—is demeaning. Indeed, it should be 
offensive to any African-American or Hispanic applicant who has 
overcome adversity and graduated in the Top Ten Percent of his or her 
class. Thus, invalidating the University’s affirmative action program will 
send a message that achieving a diverse student body is a compelling 
state interest, provided that the process by which education diversity is 
achieved is as egalitarian as the ends such programs promote. 
